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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
William J. Lester appeals from the summary dismissal of all but one of his postconviction relief claims, and the denial of the remaining claim following an evidentiary
hearing.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Underlying Criminal Proceedings
In 2008, K.A.M. (

) lived with her father most of the time, but spent

every other weekend at her mother's house in Eagle, Idaho, where her mother's
boyfriend, William Lester ("Lester"), also lived. 1 (Trial Tr.,2 Vol. 5, p.32, Ls.10-22; p.37,
L.16 - p.38, L.23; p.121, Ls.16-24.) K.A.M. had two half-sisters, E.S. (five years old at
the time of retrial), and A.G. (seventeen at the time of retrial), but they did not live with
K.A.M. and her father. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.33, Ls.9-11; p.34, Ls.24-25.)
One "stay-home" day when K.A.M. was eight years old, she was at her mother's
home during the daytime with E.S., when Lester told K.A.M. to go into his (and K.A.M.'s
mother's) bedroom, and that they were going to make candy for K.A.M.'s mother. (Trial
Tr., Vol. 5, p.41, L.7 - p.43, L.4.) After Lester followed K.A.M. into his bedroom, he tied
a cloth blindfold over her eyes, preventing her from seeing anything. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5,
p.43, L.13 - p.44, L.5.) K.A.M. thought the bedroom door was closed before she was
blindfolded, and after Lester blindfolded her, he sat down and told her they were making
candy for her mother, and gave her some lotion.
1

(Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.44, Ls.10-25.)

K.A.M.'s parents divorced in 2003. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.132, Ls.4-5.)

2

The district court took judicial notice of the underlying criminal trial transcript, and it
has been included as an exhibit to the record on appeal. (R., pp.98, 165.)

1

K.A.M. had seen a container of lotion on the bedroom dresser before she was
blindfolded, and described it as "round and in a circle, like a jar that is open on the top.
(Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.45, L.18 - p.46, L.5.)
After Lester put K.A.M.'s hand into the lotion container, he had her rub lotion,
using both hands, up and down on what she recognized to be his "private," which she
said "was up towards the ceiling and it felt like skin, and it was kind of bumpy." (Trial
Tr., Vol. 5, p.47, Ls.4-23; p.48, Ls.11-13; p.49, L.11 - p.50, L.7.)

K.A.M. further

described the body part Lester had her rub with lotion as being shaped like a finger, but
bigger. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.47, L.24 - p.48, L.4.) When Lester told K.A.M. to "suck on it
and bite it," she complied. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.50, Ls.12-18.) When she was biting him,
Lester said, "Don't bite too hard." (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.50, Ls.19-24.) At some point, the
sexual contact "just stopped," and when Lester took the blindfold off K.A.M., she saw
that he had all of his clothes on. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.51, Ls.3-9.)
K.A.M. did not tell anyone about what Lester had done to her until August of
2009 when she was alone with her older sister, A.G., while visiting at A.G.'s
grandmother's house. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.54, L.23 - p.57, L.20; p.83, Ls.8-14; p.97,
L.23 - p.99, L.23.) Because K.A.M. and A.G.'s mother was in jail at that time, A.G.
waited until she was released from jail, about a week or two, before telling her mother
what K.A.M. had disclosed. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.100, Ls.7-23.) On August 22, 2009,
Boise Police Officer Adam Crist responded to a call by K.A.M.'s mother to go to a
residence in Boise, where he contacted K.A.M.'s mother and K.A.M., and took an initial
report before switching the call to the Ada County Sheriff's Office because the incident
reported had occurred outside Boise City. (Trial Tr., Vol. 5, p.2, L.10 - p.13, L.22.)
2

Lester was charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen,
one count for oral-genital contact with E.S., and one count for oral-genital and manualgenital contact with K.A.M. (R., pp.15-17.) During the initial jury trial, E.S. was unable
to testify while on the witness stand, and the district court declared a mistrial. (R., p.96;
Trial Tr., Vol. 3, p.219, L.9 - p.225, L.24.) After a new trial date was set (R., pp.99-100),
Lester was tried in regard to the count involving K.A.M. as a victim, and convicted by a
jury of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. (R., pp.135, 144). The court imposed
a unified 20-year sentence with five years fixed.

(R., pp.164-168.)

Lester filed a

"Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence and for Leave" (R., p.176), which was denied
(Mem. Dec. and Order Re: Rule 35; see this Court's 6/20/11 "Order"). Lester appealed,
alleging a violation of his right to confrontation and that the prosecutor engaged in
misconduct by commenting on his right to silence. State v. Lester, Docket No. 38023,
Unpublished Opinion No. 427 (Idaho App.

March 30, 2010).

Appeals affirmed Lester's judgment of conviction.

kL

The Idaho Court of

The Idaho Supreme Court

denied Lester's Petition for Review (R., p.6), and the Remittitur was filed on or about
June 9, 2012 (Idaho State Repository, Ada Co. Case No.CR-FE-2009-0019484.)

Course Of Post-Conviction Proceedings
On October 9, 2012, Lester filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (R.,
pp.5-14), and the state subsequently filed an Ansv,er (R., pp.37-46). The district court
described Lester's first claim as asserting ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
call a medical expert or "Lester himself or various lay witnesses" to show he had a "skin
condition which would cause a serious reaction if any lotion or cream were to be placed

3

on his genitals." (R., pp.99-101.)

Lester's second claim was that his trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to "find and call [alibi] witnesses who would support his view that he
had limited access to the victim because she did not reside with him at the time of the
alleged criminal behavior." (R., p.101 (explanation added).) Lastly, Lester claimed that
the state "impermissibly made a reference to his polygraph examination." (R., p.104.)
After the district court appointed counsel for Lester, the state filed a motion for an
order taking judicial notice of the record, transcript, and pre-sentence report in the
underlying criminal case, which was granted. (R., pp.49-50, 63-65, 98.) The state filed
a motion for summary dismissal with a supporting brief. (R., pp.66-85.) After a hearing,
the court summarily dismissed all of Lester's claims - except the part of Lester's first
claim alleging trial counsel failed to call him or other lay witnesses (vis-a-vis medical
experts) to show that lotion causes his skin to have a serious reaction. (R., pp.97-105).
After an evidentiary hearing on the remaining claim, the court issued a memorandum
decision and judgment denying that claim. (R., pp.142-152.) Lester filed a timely notice
of appeal. (R., pp.153-157.)

4

ISSUES
Lester states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Was the District Court's decision to dismiss Mr. Lester's postconviction petition erroneous, and as such did it err in not finding
trial counsel ineffective?

2.

Did the District Court err, and violate Mr. Lester's 5th Amendment
right to remain silent by inferring that Mr. Lester's failure to mention
his skin allergy to lotions, soaps, creams and detergents in any of
his pre-arrest, post-Miranda interviews with detectives was
evidence of his guilt?

The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as:
Has Lester failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal of his
claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call medical experts to testify in
regard to his skin allergy, and in the denial of his claim, after an evidentiary hearing, that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have Lester himself and other lay witnesses
testify about his skin allergy?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
Lester Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of His
Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Call Medical Experts To
Testify In Regard To His Skin Allergy, And In The Denial Of His Claim, After An
Evidentiary Hearing, That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Have Lester
Himself And Other Lay Witnesses Testify About His Skin Allergy
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Lester argues that the district court erred by (1) summarily dismissing

his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call medical experts to testify
about his skin condition, and (2) by denying his claim, following an evidentiary hearing,
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to have Lester himself and other lay
witnesses testify about his skin condition.3

Lester's second issue, which asserts that the district court violated his right to silence
by "inferring that [his] failure to mention his skin allergy to lotions, soaps, creams and
detergents in any of his pre-arrest, post-Miranda interviews with detectives was
evidence of his guilt" is untenable. (Appellant's Brief, p.28-A.) The right to silence
under the Fifth Amendment is not self-executing, but as a general rule, it must be
affirmatively invoked. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 427-428 (1984). There is no
indication by Lester that he invoked such right.
3

In deciding whether Lester was prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficient
performance, the district court was entitled to compare the inconsistencies (and
omissions) between Lester's pre-trial statements and trial testimony. The right against
self-incrimination embodied in the federal and state constitutions "is not absolute ... and
applies only when the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying guilt." State v.
Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 821, 965 P.2d 174, 181 (1998) (emphasis added). In that
regard, cross examination about why trial testimony contains factual allegations
inconsistent with (or omitted from) previous statements is proper. Anderson v. Charles,
447 U.S. 404 (1980); State v. Rodgers, 119 Idaho 1066, 812 P.2d 1227 (Ct. App. 1990).
In short, the court properly considered Lester's inconsistent statements as a way of
questioning ("impeaching") his trial testimony about his skin condition - it did not use
any "invocation of silence" solely to imply he was guilty of the offense. Lester has failed
to make any viable showing that the district court violated his right to remain silent.
6

A review of the record and the applicable legal standards shows that Lester's
arguments have no merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate

court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief.
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v.
State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc.,
111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters findings of
fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings of fact only if they
are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of law drawn by the district
court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730
(1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and
the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the province
of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App.
2003). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of
proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,
965 (Ct. App. 1990).

7

C.

Lester Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing His
Claim That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Call Medical Experts
To Testify About His Skin Condition
1.

Summary Dismissal Standards

"Idaho Code§ 19-4906 permits a court to rule summarily on applications for postconviction relief." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) "A
court may grant the motion of either party under I.C. § 19-4906(c), or may dismiss the
application sua sponte under I.C. § 19-4906(b)."

kl

Summary disposition of a post-

conviction petition "is appropriate if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of
material fact." Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b),
(c)).

"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present

evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which
the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d
278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).
"[W]here a trial court dismisses a claim based upon grounds other than those
offered-by

the

State's

motion

for

summary

dismissal,

and

accompanying

memoranda-the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with a 20day notice period." Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523, 236 P.3d 1277, 1283 (2010). If
"the dismissal is based upon the grounds offered by the State, additional notice is
unnecessary."

kl

Where there is "significant overlap between the reasoning in the

district court's decision and the State's motion to dismiss," the district court's reliance on
additional reasoning not provided by the state does not make dismissal "so different in
kind as to transform its decision into a sua sponte dismissal" that would require it to give
20 days notice of its intent to dismiss. Workman, 144 Idaho at 524, 164 P.3d at 804.
8

2.

Lester Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Claim

In his post-conviction petition, Lester alleged that, prior to his arrest, "he was
under the care of Dr. James H. Stewart, M.D. PH.D. [sic], a Dermatologist." (R., p.7.)
Lester asserted that Dr. Stewart was "well aware of [his] condition; specifically, cause,
degree of reaction and required treatments[,r and because his trial counsel "forgot to
deal with ... the issue[,]" "Dr. Stewart did not testify at trial." (R., p.8.) Related to that
claim, Lester also alleged he had "received treatment from Medical [sic] staff at the Ada
County Jail as a result of skin breakouts that could be attributed to his existing skin
condition[,]" and his trial counsel "failed to timely obtain this evidence." (Id.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of the "Dr. Stewart" claim due to Lester's
failure "to provide any admissible evidence by either the production of the medical
records or an affidavit from Dr. Stewart, as to what Dr. Stewart would have testified to
had he been called as a witness and how the said information would have made a
difference in the outcome of the case." (R., pp.74-75.) In regard to Lester's claim that
his trial counsel failed to obtain his medical records from the Ada County Jail, the state
similarly contended, "[a]gain, it is a general and conclusory claim without providing any
admissible evidence of the medical condition, [or] it's relationship to the substance the
child described being applied to his skin some two years earlier in time." (R., p.77.)
The state requested summary dismissal of Lester's petition on the basis that it
contained "mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence."

(R.,

p.83.) At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Lester's counsel

9

informed the court that she did not intend to file any written opposition to the state's
motion, but would present argument that day. (4/30/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.17-21.)
The district court subsequently issued a written decision, analyzing Lester's twopart claim as follows (in relevant part):
Lester claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Evidence was adduced at trial that the victim, K.M., was directed by Lester
to place a strawberry-scented lubricating liquid onto his penis. Lester
claims that he has a skin condition which would cause a serious reaction if
any lotion or cream were to be placed on his genitals. He claims this
condition was known to various family members who could testify on his
behalf. Furthermore, Lester claims he had seen a physician for this
condition and may have been treated for the condition while in jail awaiting
trial. Lester argues that counsel failed to timely address this potential
defense which prevented this evidence from being admitted at trial.
The State argues that Lester was obligated to come forward with
some evidence of what the physician or jail medical staff would testify to
and has failed to do so ....
The Court agrees that Lester's failure to provide the Court with
admissible evidence of what the physician or jail medical staff would have
testified to is fatal to a claim of ineffective assistance due to not calling
these medical witnesses. Where a petitioner fails to "present an affidavit
from the doctor in support of his application for post-conviction relief
confirming what the doctor would have testified to ... [the petitioner's]
allegation as to how the doctor would have testified is merely speculative."
Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, 710, 274 P.3d 1, 11 (Ct. App. 2012),
review denied (Apr. 25, 2012). This speculation amounts to "conclusory
allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence" and, accordingly,
summary dismissal of this particular claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is proper.
(R., pp.99-100 (footnote omitted).)
The affidavits filed by Lester in support of his post-conviction petition do not
contain any information from Dr. Stewart about what he \Nould testify to in regard to
Lester's skin condition, nor do they state what jail medical staff (or records) actually say
about his skin condition. (See R., pp.5-54.) The district court correctly held that those
10

claims are "conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence." (R., p.100.)
Inasmuch as Lester failed to present any genuine issue of material fact, the district court
properly granted the state's motion to summarily dismiss those claims. See Workman,
144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; I.C. § 19-4906(b).

D.

Lester Has Failed To Show Error in The Denial Of His Claim, After An
Evidentiary Hearing, That His Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Call
Lester Or Other Lay Witnesses To Testify About His Skin Condition
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. Estes v.
State, 111 ldaho430, 436,725 P.2d 135,141 (1986); Clarkv. State, 92 ldaho827, 830,
452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). A petitioner seeking relief on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel must prove "that his counsel was deficient in his performance and
that this deficiency resulted in prejudice." Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 922, 828
P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,776 P.2d 424
(1989)).
"To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show that his
attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. This objective
standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was competent and diligent."
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 367-368 (2008) (internal
citations omitted). To moot thic hurdon "ronuiros sho•.,inn +h~+ f'nuncel marl,:, i::>rrorc::
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serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment."

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

"[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those
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decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation"

Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-154, 177

P.3d at 367-368.
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,761,760 P.2d 1174, 1177 (1988); Cowger v.
State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,245 (Ct. App. 1999).
The district court held an evidentiary hearing on Lester's sole remaining claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Lester or other lay witnesses to
testify about Lester's skin condition because such testimony would have severely
challenged the credibility of K.A.M.'s trial testimony.

At the hearing, testimony was

presented by Lester's trial counsel (Mr. Cahill), Lester, and Angela Sheldon, Lester's
former girlfriend who lived with Lester for about two years. (8/16/13 Tr., p.105, L.19 p.106, L.19; p.111, Ls.4-6.) After the hearing, the court denied Lester's claim by issuing
a Memorandum Decision and Order Re: State's Motion for Summary Disposition. (R.,
pp.142-150.) The state adopts, as its response to this issue, the following portions of
the district court's decision (with bracketed references to the record):
Lester claims that trial counsel, Mr. Cahill, was ineffective because
he failed to elicit testimony from Lester and others about his skin
condition. Lester claims that he requested counsel to advance this
defense and he did not. [8/16/13 Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.17, L.9; p.25, L.16 p.26, L.5.] At the hearing Lester argues that family members and friends
would have been available to testify as to his condition had counsel
presented this defense. [8/16/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-21.] Lester also contends
that jail records support this defense documenting reactions and break
outs [sic] he has had while incarcerated. [8/16/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.5-13; p.38,
Ls.10-19.]

12

The pre-trial conference for the second trial was held on March 26,
2010. [8/16/13 Tr., p.66, L.25 - p.68, L.10.] Both sides indicated they
were ready for trial. In an e-mail to the State's Attorney dated March 31,
2010, Mr. Cahill disclosed for the first time that Lester had a medical
condition that caused him to be allergic to most lotions. [8/16/13 Tr., p.63,
L.21 - p.66, L.17.] Mr. Cahill assumed there would be an objection if
Lester wanted to present this evidence due to the late disclosure. Mr.
Cahill indicated he was going to ask for a continuance to investigate the
claim. [8/16/13 Tr., p.65, Ls.9-16.] A copy of this e-mail was introduced
as Exhibit 4 to the hearing. [8/16/13 Tr., p.63, L.21 - p.65, L.2.]
On the morning of the first day of the new trial, April 5, 2010, Mr.
Cahill did make an oral motion to continue the trial. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.1,
Ls.20-25.] Mr. Cahill stated he intended to raise this issue at the pre-trial
conference but forgot. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2, Ls.1-18.] He explained that
Lester had been under a doctor's care for a condition that caused Lester
to "break out" when his skin contacted some lotions. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2,
Ls.1-5.] Mr. Cahill stated Lester had the reaction to alcohol and petroleum
based products. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2, Ls.5-6.] Cahill had received and
reviewed jail medical records and records from Lester's private physician,
Dr. Stewart. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2, L.19- p.3, L.11; 8/16/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.59.] These records were not presented to the Court on April 5, 2010. [Vol.
4, Trial Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.] Mr. Cahill did not state that Lester was allergic to
all lotions. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2, Ls.1-8.] The State objected to a
continuance. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.1.] The Court denied the
request. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.12, L.22 - p.13, L.5.]
Lester testified that Mr. Cahill advised him not to discuss the allergy
during Lester's testimony at the second trial. [8/16/13 Tr., p.21, L.19 p.22, L.2.] Mr. Cahill testified he recalled that Lester wanted to use the
skin condition as a defense at the second trial, but that he was not
convinced it would work as a defense. [8/16/13 Tr., p.67, L.18 - p.68,
L.1 O; p.72, L.2 - p.73, L.1; p.94, Ls.5-21.] Mr. Cahill stated he wanted
more precise information about what specifically caused the skin reaction.
[8/16/13 Tr., p.80, Ls.16-23; p.87, L.12 - p.88, L.9.] Mr. Cahill testified it
would have been a good defense if a doctor could testify that Lester would
have a skin reaction to all lotions. [8/16/13 Tr., p.80, Ls.14-23; p.84, L.14
- p.85, L.1 O; p.87, Ls.12-19; p.91, Ls.5-25.] Mr. Cahill testified that his
investigator reported that Lester may not have been allergic to water
based lotions. [8/16/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.21-25.] Mr. Cahill also testified the
records from the jail showed that Lester had eczema, but there was
nothing about what kind or [sic] lotions or if any lotions caused Lester to
have a skin reaction. [8/16/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.5-19.] Counsel expressed a
concern about presenting this unexplored defense without knowing exactly
what lotions Lester was allergic to and how he reacted. [8/16/13 Tr., p.91,
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L.21 - p.92, L.3.] At the hearing, Lester elicited testimony from Mr. Cahill
that in retrospect he would have attempted to raise the defense of the
lotion and skin condition. [8/16/13 Tr., p.84, L.14 - p.85, L.10; p.99, Ls.37 .] Mr. Cahill testified it was possible that had the defense been raised the
outcome could have been different. [8/16/13 Tr., p.85, Ls.7-10.]
Angela Sheldon disclosed she was Lester's girlfriend and was living
with Lester at the time of the incident. [8/16/13 Tr., p.105, L.19 - p.106,
L.14.] She was incarcerated in Elmore County at the time of the second
trial. [8/16/13 Tr., p.104, Ls.8-25.] She was transported to the Ada
County Courthouse and was prepared to testify about the alleged skin
condition if Lester raised the issue in his testimony. [8/16/13 Tr., p.104,
L.11 - p.105, L.6.] She stated that Lester did not have any allergy to any
lotion, and would have provided that testimony at the trial. [8/16/13 Tr.,
p.105, Ls.7-13.] She provided specific examples of lotions and creams
Lester used. [8/16/13 Tr., p.106, L.20 - p.108, L.1; p.111, Ls.9-12.] She
explained that she had showered with Lester and he used soap and
shampoo. [8/16/13Tr., p.111, Ls.4-12.]
The decision not to present evidence of this condition was tactical.
Mr. Cahill has more than 30 years experience as a criminal defense
lawyer, and has significant experience in trying criminal cases to juries.
[8/16/13 Tr., p.50, Ls.2-3.] However, in this case, Lester has shown that
there is evidence that counsel's decision may have resulted from
inadequate preparation. Counsel was aware of Lester's claim but did not
begin to examine the claim critically until shortly before trial. [8/16/13 Tr.,
p.65, L.4 - p.67, L.17.] Counsel forgot to alert the Court that this may
have been an important issue in the case. [Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2, Ls.1-18.]
The issue was not raised until the day of trial. [Id.]
Counsel did have medical records from the jail and a physician.
[Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.2, L.19 - p.3, L.11; 8/16/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.5-9.] However,
Lester has not made any showing about what those documents disclose.
[Vol. 4, Trial Tr., p.8, Ls.6-9.] Lester testified he would have told the jury
that he is allergic to any and all lotions. [8/16/13 Tr., p.21, Ls.16-23.] It
seems obvious that the medical records did not fully support Lester's claim
because counsel never made such a representation. [See generally
8/16/13 Tr., pp.4-99.) Counsel's investigator indicated that Lester may not
have been allergic to water based products. [8/16/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.17-25.]
Even if counsel's decision was the result of some shortcoming, to
obtain post conviction relief, Lester must demonstrate that the outcome
would have been different. Angela Sheldon's testimony would have
disputed Lester's claim. The State has also demonstrated that Lester
failed to assert this claim when interviewed separately by two investigating
14

officers, and failed to assert this claim when he took a polygraph
examination. The Court concludes that Lester has failed to meet his
burden to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the jury
would have reached a different conclusion. Accordingly, the Court will
deny the petition for post conviction relief.
(R., pp.146-148.)
The district court's factual findings are supported by the record and should not be
disturbed.

Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 276-277, 971 P.2d at 729-730. The only evidence

Lester presented to show he was allergic to all lotions was his own testimony. Lester
failed to tell the investigators and the polygraph examiner about his skin condition, and
did not disclose what the records from the jail and the physician showed. The court was
entitled to draw the reasonable inference that such records did not support Lester's
claim. Peterson, 139 Idaho at 97, 73 P.3d at 110. Moreover, Lester's former girlfriend,
Angela Sheldon, was ready to testify that Lester had no apparent skin condition during
their two years of living together, which was also during the time of the offense.
In short, the district court correctly concluded that even if Lester's trial counsel
was deficient in failing to timely pursue the skin allergy defense, Lester "failed to meet
his burden to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the jury would have
reached a different conclusion." (R., p.148.)

Lester has failed to show that the district

court's denial of his claim was erroneous, and the court's decision should be affirmed.
Sanders, 117 Idaho at 940, 792 P.2d at 965.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order
granting summary dismissal on all but one of Lester's post-conviction claims, and the
district court's order denying the remaining claim following an evidentiary hearing.
DATED this 21st day of December, 2015.
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